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Abstract  In this paper we attempt to identify behavioral differences 
between public and private not-for-profit hospitals, by exploiting the 
introduction of the DRG-based payment system in the Italian NHS during 
the second half of the Nineties. We estimate the technical efficiency of a 
sample of hospitals for the period 1995-2000 considering an output distance 
function, and adopting both parametric (COLS and SF) and non-parametric 
(DEA) approaches. Our results show a convergence of mean efficiency 
scores between not-for-profit and public hospitals, and seem to suggest that 
differences in economic performances between competing ownership forms 
are more the result of the institutional settings in which they operate than the 
effect of the incentive structures embedded in the different proprietary 
forms. We also observe a decline in technical efficiency, probably due to 
policies aimed at reducing hospitalization rates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last decades, having experienced an increase in public health care 
spending, the health systems of many Western European countries have 
been the subject of different reforms aimed at increasing efficiency and 
reducing the costs of service provision. Various efforts have been made to 
reach these objectives, for instance the creation of “quasi markets” for 
health services or the modification of public reimbursement schemes to 
public or private service providers. Effects of these reforms are highly 
debated. In particular, the impact of incentives created by public policies 
may vary significantly following the institutional settings of service 
provision in different countries. Moreover, organizations with different 
ownership structures (public, for-profit and nonprofit) could respond to 
incentives and adjust their behavior in different ways and with different 
speed. 
The Italian hospital sector is a good example at hand of such a change in 
public policies aimed at increasing efficiency and reducing the costs of 
health services. Starting from 1995, the funding mechanism for hospitals 
operating in the National Health Service moved from a cost-based ex-post 
payment (for public hospitals) and bed-day rate (for private ones) to a 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) based on Diagnostic Related Groups 
(DRG) that applies to both types of hospitals. The aim of this paper is to use 
the opportunity offered by this radical change in public health policy in 
order to identify behavioral differences between public hospitals and private 
nonprofit ones. Considering a sample of more than 500 Italian hospitals 
over a 6 year time span (1995-2000), the paper investigates whether 
differences in technical efficiency of hospitals with different ownership 
structures were affected by the introduction of this reform. We also explore 
whether hospitals technical efficiency increased following the introduction 
of the DRG-based payment system. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the relationship 
between ownership structure, payment systems, and performance in the   3
hospital sector. We first analyze, from a theoretical standpoint, the potential 
impact of incentive structures on the performance of public, private for-
profit and nonprofit organizations, and thus emphasize the inconclusive 
results emerging from the empirical evaluation of efficiency. We also 
investigate whether different types of organizations behave differently. In 
section 3 we briefly describe the Italian hospital industry, paying particular 
attention to public funding mechanisms. Section 4 includes the empirical 
part of the paper. We illustrate our testing strategy concentrating on two 
possible consequences of the policy reform that represent the basis of two 
testable hypotheses: (i) the potential reduction of the differences in technical 
efficiency between public and nonprofit hospitals, and (ii) the potential 
increase in technical efficiency as a consequence of the policy reform. We 
also describe the methodological approaches for measuring technical 
efficiency, estimating an output distance functions with standard non-
parametric and parametric techniques, and present our sample of Italian 
hospitals. Some considerations for further research on these issues are 
discussed in section 5. 
We find evidence of a convergence in the mean level of efficiency between 
the two types of producers, public and not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals, even 
though we find no conclusive evidence for the disappearance of the 
differences in mean efficiency scores, probably because of the relatively 
limited time span analyzed. We try to show that this convergence suggests 
that differences in economic performances between competing ownership 
forms are more the result of the institutional settings in which they operate - 
e.g., the reimbursement schemes - than the effect of the incentive structures 
embedded in the different proprietary forms. Moreover, our findings support 
the idea that the introduction of a DRG-based reimbursement scheme caused 
a decline in technical efficiency, more pronounced for private NFP hospitals 
than for public ones. One possible explanation for the observed decline in 
technical efficiency is related to the de-hospitalization policy pursued in 
Italy during the Nineties: excess capacity increased more for private   4
nonprofit hospitals than for public ones. This point, however, deserves 
further research. 
 
2. Ownership structures, reimbursement schemes and performance in 
the hospital sector 
 
The impact of ownership. Ownership has a relevant role in explaining 
economic performance; in fact, different ownership structures create 
different incentives to economic actors. In general, private ownership 
characterized by the presence of residual claimants should represent a 
powerful incentive to economic efficiency and cost reduction; on the 
contrary, public ownership and/or the absence of any claimant of residual 
earnings (because of the presence of a non-distribution constraint, NDC 
from now on) may induce shirking and could decrease effort, consequently 
reducing efficiency (e.g., [1]). This simple rationalization for economic 
efficiency represents the basis of the wide “privatization movement” 
experienced by several western countries over the last twenty-five years. 
More recently, privatization policies involved sectors – such as health and 
social services – that for a long time had been considered emblematic of 
public provision and production, because of the presence of market failures. 
However, in these areas, privatization has often taken the form of 
transferring service provision to NFP rather than for-profit organizations, 
i.e., private organizations subject to a NDC. 
The reasons why nonprofit organizations represent a relevant player in many 
“welfare sectors” (such as health) of western economies are well explained 
by a strand of economic literature that concentrates on “information 
asymmetries” [2] and “government failure” [3]. According to this literature, 
NFP organizations can be considered as an intermediate form between 
private and public firms: in fact, even though they are privately owned, 
nonprofit organizations cannot distribute profits to any residual claimant; 
this reduces their incentives to exploit information asymmetries - typical of   5
many welfare industries, health included [4] - while it increases citizens 
reliance in nonprofit organizations as providers of welfare services [5].  
Nonetheless, the impact of these characteristics on efficiency is far from 
being understood. While the absence of any owner, i.e., residual claimant à 
la Alchian-Demsetz, may produce a negative impact on efficiency by 
reducing managerial efforts, the NDC could represent a powerful device for 
controlling information asymmetries among different stakeholders [6], 
therefore increasing their efficiency by augmenting demand. Although 
public and private NFP firms share a common NDC, they may differ 
because they pursue different goals, and therefore they face different 
possibilities to attract particular inputs (such as, for instance, time and 
money donations). These differences, in turn, can explain differences in 
executives’ compensation, and help explain different behavior and outputs 
produced by organizations subject to the same NDC [7]. Even if subject to 
the same NDC, public and private NFP differ from each other because only 
public organizations can be characterized by a soft budget constraint. As a 
consequence, private NFP share with for-profit firms a common incentive to 
comply with the hard budget constraint. 
 
Ownership and performance in the hospital sector. In order to assess the 
impact of ownership on performance, one needs to develop a reliable system 
of performance measurement. In this paper we consider technical efficiency 
as a good proxy for the performance of a production unit. Efficiency is 
generally measured as the distance between a single unit and the “best 
practice” production (or cost) frontier, that can be estimated with several 
techniques (see, for instance, [8]). A vast literature deals with empirical 
analysis of technical efficiency and ownership structure in the hospital 
sector. In general, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Indeed, “overall, 
the empirical evidence demonstrates no systematic differences in efficiency 
between for-profit and NFP hospitals” [9]. This statement is consistent with 
former research results, as in [10]. In fact, studies using different techniques 
to estimate efficient frontiers get different results. Wilson and Jadlow [11],   6
using a linear programming technique, found that nonprofit hospitals were 
less efficient than for-profit hospitals but more efficient than public ones. 
Using stochastic frontier regressions, [12] could not find any relevant 
difference in efficiency between hospitals with different ownership 
structures. On the contrary, [13] and [4] found public and nonprofit hospital 
more efficient than for-profit ones. A more recent paper [15] compared 
public with private nonprofit and private for profit hospitals, and found that 
the main difference between the three types of producers is the soft budget 
constraint characterizing the public ones. In his analysis, [15] found that 
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals were equally responsive to changes in 
financial incentives (represented by an increase in state funding for services 
provided to indigent patients) and significantly more responsive than public 
hospitals; at the same time, both profit and nonprofit institutions tended to 
use growth in revenues to increase their financial assets, while public 
institutions did not. 
 
The impact of reimbursement systems. Nonetheless, the ownership structure 
(public, for-profit or NFP) is not the only relevant factor explaining 
economic performance; in fact, economic incentives also matter. In 
particular, given the relevance of public funds in backing and financing 
hospitals, efficiency of institutions with different ownership structures 
should also be considered in the light of the rules used by public authorities 
to regulate and fund hospitals. In fact, differences in efficiency may 
originate both from incentive structures characterizing hospitals with 
different ownership forms, and from diversity in the regulatory rules and the 
funding mechanism used by public (as well as private) institutions to 
finance private and public hospitals. 
As assessed by a wide strand of literature, mostly based on evidence from 
the USA, hospital’s payment on the basis of reimbursement of incurred 
costs provides no effective incentives to both cost containment and price 
competition among hospitals, thus resulting in massive increase in health 
costs for both private and public purchasers of health services. In the USA,   7
in the Seventies, this growth in health expenditures encouraged a vast 
movement toward public regulation of hospitals, in the form of rate 
regulation and capital expenditure controls on new hospitals as well as 
expansion of existing ones. 
While the effects of these regulations on cost containment are highly 
debated, at the beginning of the Eighties a new PPS was introduced for 
hospitals providing services to population covered by the public Medicare 
program. Under this payment system, hospitals are paid a fixed amount 
correlated to the severity of patients treated, classified according to a set of 
DRG. The PPS is supposed to alter hospitals’ incentives - when compared to 
reimbursement of incurred costs - in several ways. First of all, PPS should 
reduce hospitals’ incentives to increase average length of stay (ALOS form 
now on) for their patients. In fact, “reductions in inpatients costs through 
shorter stays would now improve a hospital’s bottom line” [16]. Moreover, 
under the assumption that both public and private hospitals respond to 
opportunities to increase their profits, the PPS should also induce hospitals 
to increase the number of admissions for cases whose costs are below 
reimbursement. 
The effects of this new “regulation” on cost containment in the American 
context however are mixed. As widely shown in [17] in a review of studies 
dealing with the impact of PPS on American hospitals, the introduction of 
the new reimbursement system – consistently with expectations - decreased 
ALOS; this reduction was not limited to specific diagnoses, but interested - 
across the board - all patients and diagnoses. As far as admission is 
concerned, the authors report a decrease in admission as a consequence of 
the introduction of PPS, while an increase was expected because hospitals 
“theoretically could enhance their revenue and margins by increasing the 
number of admissions for all DRGs for which payment exceeded the 
marginal cost of care” [17]. This unexpected result could be attributed to the 
effectiveness of controls operated by Peer Review Organizations, whose 
activity prevented hospitals from increasing marginal admissions of 
profitable patients. As a second explanation, hospitals could have faced a   8
“greater incentive to shift admissions to outpatients treatment rather than to 
increase inpatients admissions” [17]. 
Several people were concerned about the possible reduction in quality of 
care caused by the introduction of PPS and the correlated incentive of 
hospitals to save on costs. As far as “intensity of care”
1 is concerned, [17] 
report that “the studies just reviewed show PPS to have reduced the 
intensity of care or to have left the intensity of care unchanged (but,) (…) 
the best study (…) actually finds an improvement after PPS”. Overall the 
authors assert that “the negative effect of PPS on quality are not so large and 
consistent as to register on commonly accepted measures of major patients 
outcome” [17]. 
The introduction of PPS had a noteworthy impact on case-mix of patients 
treated, whose significant – and costly - increase was at least in part 
attributable to hospital’s incentive to “upcoding” and “DRG creep”. As for 
different ownership structures, the empirical evidence shows that for-profit 
hospitals tend to upcode patients more than public and private nonprofit 
ones [18]. However, nonprofit hospitals behave more similarly to for-profit 
ones in markets dominated by this last type of hospitals (e.g., [19]). 
Moreover, distinguishing between “nominal” and “real” responses to price 
changes
2, [18] finds that hospitals did not change intensity or quality of care 
provided to patients under DRG subject to price increase, so that upcoding 
only resulted in a “nominal” change. These results are consistent with 
findings of prior research, showing that the introduction of PPS did not 
increase the number of patients treated. This effect is one of the most 
frequently cited reasons explaining why PPS was not completely effective 
in containing health costs.  
 
3. The Italian hospital sector 
 
                                                 
1 Measured by the number of laboratory tests, therapeutic procedures, medications, days of 
intensive care unit utilization, etc.. 
2 Where “nominal” responses refer to hospital coding practices, while “real” responses 
refers to admission volumes and intensity of care provided.   9
The hospital sector in Italy represents a good example of a recent trend – 
common to other countries - for the creation of quasi-markets in welfare 
industries. In fact, services in the Italian hospital sector are supplied by a 
vast array of organizations that can be characterized as public, private for-
profit and private NFP.
3 All these hospitals compete with each other for the 
provision of services, either directly (in Regions where patients are entitled 
to choose their provider of hospital health care services
4, or moving to a 
different Region), or indirectly (in Regions where Local Health Units
5 
negotiate for their patients with public and private producers). While public 
hospitals are generally completely financed with public funds, private 
hospitals rely on a mix of public funds (counterpart of services provided to 
citizen covered by the National Health System, NHS from now on) and 
private ones (coming from citizens acquiring services that add to, or replace, 
those provided by the NHS). 
In 2001, according to the most recent data made available by the Census of 
industries and services [22], in Italy operated more than 3000 hospitals
6; the 
largest share of these hospitals was run by for-profit corporations (39%), 
followed by public (38%) and nonprofit institutions (22%). When 
considering employees
7, however, public hospitals gain the upper hand with 
about 79% of personnel, followed by nonprofit (11%) and for-profit 
hospitals (10%)
8. Considering employees as a proxy variable for the number 
                                                 
3 In particular, given their ownership structure, we consider as “public” the following 
categories of hospitals:  Hospitals incorporated as public firms (Aziende Ospedaliere),  
Local hospitals directly managed by Local Health Units (LHU), the local branches of the 
National Health System (NHS) (Ospedali a gestione diretta ASL), Teaching and research 
hospitals incorporated as public bodies (Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico 
pubblici) and University hospitals (Policlinici Universitari). We classified as “not-for-
profit” hospitals both Teaching and research hospitals incorporated as private bodies 
(Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico privati) and Hospitals run by religious 
bodies (Ospedali classificati). 
4 The Health care system in Italy is mainly managed at the regional levels (see, e.g., [20] 
and [21] for a detailed discussion.) 
5 Local Health Units (LHU from now on) are vertically integrated public providers of 
health services at the local level. They can either produce directly these services, or 
purchase them from public and private hospitals. 
6 These figure include acute, psychiatric and long term care hospitals. 
7 Data include both paid personnel (679.322 units) and volunteers (15.500 units). 
8 Most unfortunately, the census data do not provide any information about the number of 
beds and the output produced.   10
of beds, data show quite clearly that public hospitals are much larger than 
private ones, while nonprofit institutions are larger than for profit ones. 
Despite the large number of private (profit and nonprofit) institutions 
funded by the Italian NHS and providing health services to the population, 
side by side with public hospitals, the impact of ownership structure on 
performance and efficiency of these organizations has not been yet 
systematically analyzed. A few studies have been undertaken to measure 
technical efficiency of Italian hospitals. However, these studies are 
generally not interested in the relationship between efficiency and 
ownership structure, in terms of the distinction between public hospitals and 
private for-profit and NFP ones. For instance, [23] distinguish among five 
types of hospitals, but do not separate private nonprofit hospitals from 
private lucrative ones, a difference that economic theory deems to be 
important. An exception is a paper [24] that finds a weak impact of the 
nonprofit ownership structure on efficiency, considering a sample of 
hospitals located in Lombardia, the region that – at the end of the Nineties – 
moved toward the introduction of the highest level of competition in the 
hospital industry. 
Moreover, almost no attempt has been made to establish the impact of 
changes in the funding mechanism on the performance of hospitals with 
different ownership structure. The funding mechanism of Italian hospitals 
changed significantly over time. Before 1978, when the NHS was 
introduced in Italy, both public and private hospitals were funded on a bed–
day rate by patients. Rates were established at the hospital level and 
patients’ costs were covered by mutual health funds. Not surprisingly, this 
funding mechanism created the incentive to increase both prices and the 
length of treatments, therefore jeopardizing the financial firmness of mutual 
health funds. When, at the end of the Seventies, most mutual health funds 
went through significant financial difficulties, the legislature passed the so 
called “first reform” of the Italian health care system. Mutual health funds 
were replaced by the NHS, a universal scheme providing free health care to 
all of the Italian citizens. The system was funded by the central government   11
through a mixture of general and specific taxes, and was managed by 
regional authorities. Most public hospitals were incorporated into LHU, and 
did not enjoy any legal and financial autonomy, while private for-profit and 
NFP hospitals preserved their independence and many of them qualified as 
providers for the NHS. The 1978 reform established that public hospitals 
incorporated into LHU should get their funds from the budget of those units; 
in general, all of these hospitals had their expenses completely covered by 
public funds, regardless of their amount (ex-post payment). In a sense, this 
funding mechanism originated a problem of soft budget constraint, as 
hospitals costs were regularly reimbursed by the LHU, while expenses (and 
debts) of LHU were – at regular intervals of a few years – covered by 
regional and national governments (on this point, see [25]). On the contrary, 
private hospitals providing services to the NHS were to be reimbursed on a 
bed-day rate; rate levels were established at the national level and updated 
every 3 years. 
These different funding mechanisms could induce different behavior in the 
two categories of hospitals. In principle, public hospitals did not have any 
incentive to keep costs under control, given the demonstrated propensity of 
the national government to bail out their debts. This situation, together with 
a real necessity to increase the amount and quality of health services 
provided to the population, could significantly contribute to decrease 
efficiency of hospitals and to increase public spending. On the other side, 
private hospitals had a clear incentive to boost the ALOS in order to raise 
their revenues; at the same time, they were encouraged to keep costs under 
control in order to raise profits. These incentives could result in high public 
costs and high private profits. 
In 1992, difficulties in controlling public expenditures in the health sector 
gave way to a “second reform” of the Italian NHS. Public hospitals were 
given some level of autonomy (some of them – the largest – were in fact 
separated from the LHU and incorporated as self-governing public firms or 
Aziende Ospedaliere) in order to favour competition among different 
providers, and to create “quasi-markets” in some areas of the health care   12
industry. Moreover, the funding mechanism of hospitals moved from ex-
post payment (for public hospitals) and bed-day rate (for private ones) to a 
PPS that applies to both types of hospitals. The system was initially based 
on DRG with rates defined at the national level
9, but funding of hospitals 
was still in charge of the regional authorities that relied on funds transferred 
by the national government; the regional authorities were free to define rates 
different from – but not higher than – the national ones. The new 
reimbursement system – that had to be started between 1995 and 1997 – 
went through several changes in the following years: the reimbursement 
rates have been recalculated on the basis of the costs of a larger set of 
hospitals; moreover, in a general framework of devolution of tasks from the 
national to the local level, regional governments have been allowed to apply 
different regulations and, as a result, great differences in regional health 
services are now the rule more than the exception in Italy. 
Studies concerning the impact of the introduction of PPS based on DRG are 
rather scarce in Italy. Following the introduction of the new reimbursement 
scheme, [21] register a decrease in ALOS, together with a fall in the number 
of inpatients, as a result of a sharp decrease in admissions in public hospitals 
and a mild growth in admissions in for-profit hospitals. Moreover, the 
incentive effect of PPS has been reduced by the simultaneous attempt to 
contain hospitalization rates and public hospital expenditure. In this sense, 
the introduction of tight budget ceilings for hospitals may have reduced 
(technical) efficiency, generating productive capacity in excess. At the same 
time, working on a small regional sample of hospitals, [26] observe both an 
increase in day-hospital and a decrease in ordinary hospital admissions. In 
addition, the authors find a growth in severity of illness among hospitalized 
patients, partly due to upcoding and DRG creep. Similar results can be 
found in [27]. Apart from differences in the reduction of ALOS, nothing is 
known with respect to the behavioral response of hospitals to PPS-DRG 
                                                 
9  With rates based on the full costs of a very limited set of 8 medium to large hospitals.   13
introduction. This is the focus of our attention in the empirical part of the 
paper. 
 




Testing strategy. The main aim of the paper is to investigate the behavioral 
differences in public and private nonprofit hospitals using the opportunity 
offered by the change in the reimbursement scheme occurred after 1995. As 
discussed above, before the introduction of the DRG-based payment system, 
public and private hospitals faced different reimbursement schemes (hence, 
different incentives in terms of pursuing productive efficiency). On the 
contrary, with the new scheme, both private and public hospitals receive 
their funds on the basis of the amount and the nature of services provided, 
and they should share a common incentive to decrease ALOS, thus the 
average cost of treatment with respect to the reference hospitals (i.e., those 
hospitals whose costs were used as a basis for setting reimbursement rates). 
In fact, not being able to perform such a task would jeopardize the economic 
performance of the hospital. Differences in efficiency would then be due 
solely to differences in behavior characterizing the two ownership 
structures. Therefore, in the remainder of the paper we are interested in 
testing the following hypothesis: 
•  H0(A): differences in hospitals technical efficiency characterizing 
different ownership structures disappear after the introduction of the 
DRG-based payment system. 
Failing to reject H0(A), i.e., observing a convergence of efficiency between 
NFP and public hospitals, would give empirical support to the hypothesis 
that differences in efficiency between public and private hospitals were 
mainly due to different reimbursement schemes, and not to different 
incentives embedded in the diverse ownership structures.   14
The new reimbursement system is obviously aimed at keeping public 
spending for health under control, as a result of the expected improvement 
in productive efficiency; its effects could depend on capacity utilization of 
the reformed hospitals. Considering excess capacity, two alternative 
hypothesis should be considered. Suppose first that a hospital is currently 
producing health care services without excess capacity, i.e., the hospital 
produces the maximum amount of potential inpatient days given its beds: in 
this case, the hospital can reduce ALOS only by increasing beds’ turnover, 
hence the number of discharged patients. Suppose now that the hospital is 
producing with excess capacity: reduction of ALOS (and of excess capacity) 
can be obtained by increasing the number of discharged patients in this case 
too. Thus, in both cases, following the introduction of the DRG-based 
payment system, we should observe an increase in the number of patients, 
hence an increase in efficiency measured by considering the number of 
patients among outputs. Therefore, the second hypothesis to be tested is: 
•  H0(B): hospitals technical efficiency, measured by considering the 
number of patients, increases following the introduction of a DRG-
based payment system. 
Rejecting  H0(B) would give empirical support to the hypothesis that the 
change in the reimbursement scheme did not produce beneficial effects in 
terms of cost containment. 
Both tests are based on a measure of technical efficiency. We obtain scores 
of technical efficiency by estimating an output distance function (see 
below), and then testing for differences in means. In particular, the null 
hypothesis (A) will be rejected if we detect statistically significant 
differences in the mean levels of efficiency after the change in the 
reimbursement scheme between public and private NFP producers. The null 
hypothesis (B) will be rejected if we detect no statistically significant 
differences in the mean levels of efficiency before and after the change in 
the reimbursement scheme. 
Of course, one must recognize that the DRG-based payment system has 
some potential drawbacks: the very first one is the incentive to discharge   15
patients earlier than necessary, influencing negatively the quality of care; a 
second related problem is the practice of discharging and readmitting 
patients, simply to increase revenues; a third problem is the practice of 
upcoding, i.e., the hospitals’ practice of registering patients in more severe - 
and costly – DRG; a fourth problem is cream-skimming, that is the incentive 
to provide only the more lucrative - and less severe - services, the ones the 
hospital has a cost advantage for, making it quite difficult any planning of 
service provision at the local level. In this paper, because of data 
availability, we cannot control for these problems. However, [18] and [19], 
for instance, show that for-profit hospitals in the U.S. upcoded more than 
public and nonprofit ones, the two ownership structures on which our 
empirical analysis is based. 
 
Non-Parametric estimation of the output distance function. The literature on 
the measurement of productive efficiency has produced several techniques 
to estimate the efficiency characterizing production units. Here we 
concentrate only on three of these: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), 
Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS), and Stochastic Frontiers (SF). 
DEA has been used in management science to evaluate ex-post the 
efficiency of achieving an objective from a given level of inputs [28]. Its 
applications in economics build on the work of Debreu [29], Koopmans [30] 
and [31] and Farrell [32]. DEA employs linear programming techniques to 
measure efficiency as the distance of each firm from a non-parametric 
production frontier constructed from convex combinations of observed 
input-output pairs. Let 
N x + ∈ℜ  be a vector of inputs and  y
M ∈ℜ+  be a 
vector of outputs. Feasible input-output combinations are represented by the 
production possibilities set, T
NM ⊂ℜ ×ℜ ++ : 
{ } Tx y x y = ( , ):    can produce  .  (1) 
We assume that T satisfies standard axioms listed, for instance, in [33] or 
[34]. For a given input-output vector ( , ) x y , the output distance function   16
[35] is the minimum proportional expansion of all outputs such that the 
output combination can still be produced from the original input vector: 
Dy x x
y















The output distance function
10 is a non-decreasing measure of efficiency, 
homogeneous of degree 1 and convex in y, decreasing in x and ranging 
between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 represents technical output efficiency. 
The calculation of the output distance function requires the solution of a 
nonlinear programming problem, but an easier approach is available. 
Indeed, the reciprocal of the output distance function is the Farrell’s 
measures of output efficiency defined by  = ) , ( x y FO   {} T ∈ y)   (x,   : sup γ γ  
where FO xy (,) ≥1. This measure is easily obtained as a solution to a linear 
programming problem [36].  
Alternative assumptions on returns to scale characterizing production units 
are available. We start here by computing the Farrell’s measure of output 
technical efficiency for a Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) technology by 
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where the z’s are the DEA weights to be estimated, and the other variables 
remain defined as before. Färe et al. [36] suggest an informative 
decomposition of the most restrictive Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) 
technical efficiency measure into components based on scale efficiencies 
                                                 
10 We consider here an output orientation, instead of calculating an input-oriented distance 
function, because in Italy – as in other countries – the problem of waiting lists for hospitals 
has become a priority for health policies at the national level. For instance, the Budget Law 
for the year 2006 requires hospitals to respect national defined standards for waiting lists;   17
and the least restrictive VRS technical efficiency measure. The construction 
of this measure enables the decomposition of the CRS output distance 
function measure into sources of output scale and technical efficiency under 
VRS, and this latter is also referred as a measure of the pure technical 
efficiency. The decomposition can be written as: 
(, |) (, |) (,) ,
jj jj jj
OO O FxyC FxyV Sxy =×   (4) 
with j=1,…, J, where SO(x
j,y
j) is the scale efficiency measure, which can be 







In addition, by running a further DEA problem with Non-Increasing Returns 
to Scale (NIRS) imposed
12, it is possible to discern whether an hospital is 
operating in an area of increasing or decreasing returns to scale. Indeed, 
when the NIRS efficiency score is equal to the VRS score, then decreasing 
returns to scale holds locally. In the other case, when the NIRS and VRS 
efficiency scores are unequal, increasing returns to scale applies. 
 
Parametric Estimation of the output distance function. We also model the 
multi-input-multi-output production frontier of hospitals as an output 
distance function in a parametric setting by following, for instance, Coelli 
and Perelman [37]. This allows us to avoid output aggregation that can bias 
efficiency scores estimates. In particular, we specify Eq. (2) using the 
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hence, they need to increase the number of patients treated, holding constant the amount of 
resources consumed. 
11 Notice that the returns to scale estimates with an input and output orientation are equal 
only when the technology is characterised by CRS. 
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where f is an index for hospitals and t is an index for the years from 1995 to 
2000. Since homogeneity of degree 1 in output implies DO(x,ωy) = 
ωDO(x,y), ∀ω>0, we choose ω=1/yM and normalize Eq. (4) with respect to 
the m-th output: 
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Clearly, symmetry of cross-partial derivatives entails further restrictions, 









































































































where the output distance measure DO is interpreted as an error term that 
satisfies standard OLS assumptions. We also include in the model additional 
controls for year (Y) and regional (R) fixed effects; the former pick up the 
impact of factors common to all hospitals in a given year, e.g., a change in 
national regulation affecting all producers, while the latter control for the 
effect of factors common to all hospitals in a given region, e.g., the 
provision of different DRG tariffs across regions. We estimate Eq. (7) by 
initially using the COLS methodology. Consequently, we first estimate Eq. 
(7) by OLS; then, by using -εmax (the largest negative OLS residual), we 
correct the intercept parameter so that the function envelope all the 
observations as a frontier. The distance measure for the f-th hospital is thus 
defined as: 
{ } f O D ε ε − − = max exp   (8)   19
It is clear from Eq. (8) that DO=1 for the observation with the largest 
negative residual, that represents the most efficient hospital. 
We also reinterpret Eq. (7) by considering a composed error term; this is 
obtained by assuming DO is distributed as a half-normal random variable, 
and by adding a normally distributed error term v, such that ε = v + DO. The 
distance measure estimates in this SF setting are then obtained using the 
methodology proposed in [38], as E[DO|ε]
13. 
 
4.2. Data description 
 
We consider data provided by the National Ministry of Health on all Italian 
hospitals providing health care services for the NHS, and excluded 
observations with missing data and hospitals devoted to Long Term Care 
(with ALOS > 15 days). Our final sample consists of a balanced panel of 
531 hospitals, both public and NFP, observed during the years 1995-2000
14. 
Our sample period can be ideally divided into two sub-periods, one from 
1995 to 1997, in which the DRG-based payment system was introduced, and 
the other from 1998 to 2000, in which the new reimbursement scheme 
should have started to produce its desired effects. Data include information 
on different inputs and outputs usually considered in the studies on 
hospitals’ efficiency. Input variables comprise data on staff and a rough 
measure of capital (the number of beds). Output variables include data on 
the number of discharged patients and the number of inpatient days, the 
number of Day Hospital (DH) and emergency room treatments.  
The empirical literature on the estimation of technical efficiency in the 
health care sector strongly suggests the number of discharged patients to be 
the most reliable measure of output, since the number of inpatient days 
could reflect a productive choice of hospitals. For the three methodologies 
                                                 
13 In the SF model we also dropped regional and year fixed effects. See the results section 
below. 
14 The sample represents approximately one third of all Italian acute care hospitals, which 
in turn constitutes about half of all Italian hospitals as described in section 3. Private for-  20
(DEA, COLS, and SF), we then consider a distance function model that 
includes as outputs the number of discharged patients, the number of 
emergency room cases, and the number of DH treatments.
15 As input 
variables are concerned, we consider six inputs, namely the number of beds 
for ordinary hospitalization, beds for DH treatments, physicians, nurses, 
teaching staff and other employees. An F-test strongly rejected further 
aggregation of inputs for all the years considered in the sample
16. 
Unfortunately, since DRG weights are unavailable for all the years 1995-
2000, main output measures are not adjusted to take into account cross-
sectional and time series variation of case-mix; this could represent a severe 
limitation of the present analysis, that needs to be discussed in future 
research
17. There are however three elements that may reduce the impact of 
such a limitation on our results. First, while it is true that - at a national level 
– an increase in the severity of illness mix was observed, [27] suggest both 
“real” and “nominal” causes as an explanation. We do not have evidence 
that real causes are the most relevant; and real causes are the ones that could 
mostly affect our results. Among nominal causes that may have increased 
severity of illness mix, we could mention both the introduction of new DRG 
weights (in 1997), and a major improvement in the quality of data collected 
(as a consequence of the learning process in DRG management). No 
evidence is available concerning differences among hospitals in adapting to 
the new system.  
                                                                                                                            
profit hospitals could not be included since complete data are not available at the National 
Ministry of Health. 
15 In a previous version of the paper, we also considered an additional model by substituting 
the number of discharged patients with the number of inpatient days. All main findings are 
substantially unchanged. These additional results are available in the working paper version 
of this work; see [39]. 
16 In particular, we considered an alternative model with only two inputs, capital (sum of all 
available beds) and labor (sum of all employees). 
17 DRG weights for the entire Italian sample for all the relevant years after the introduction 
of the new payment system were unavailable. We then collected available data for the 
Veneto Region (77 hospitals). DEA scores calculated on this reduced regional sample 
confirm the analysis undertaken at the national level with a less refined output 
specification. Notice indeed that ALOS is included in the DRG weights, since it is anyway 
related to the complexity of treatment. These additional results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Moreover, among real causes, the increase of case-mix complexity could be 
explained as a result of the tendency toward the increase of DH treatments; 
and in our models we control for this variable. Second, [27] recall that a 
further factor impacting on case-mix is the incentive to “upcode” created by 
the introduction of PPS-DRG. While we do not have any evidence on this 
point in Italy, the international empirical literature shows that for-profit 
hospitals tend to upcode patients more than public and private nonprofit 
ones [18], these two latte being the ownership structures we are dealing 
with.  
Finally, since our main goal here is to uncover differences in behavior 
between the two groups of hospitals, unadjusted output does not constitute a 
major problem if variability within each sub-sample coincides. In fact, if 
public hospitals and private NFP hospitals belong to the same distribution, 
then one can argue that there are no detectable differences in terms of output 
case-mix with respect to the ownership structure of hospitals; in other 
words, case-mix differences are not related to ownership. Indeed, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on the distribution of the number of patients for 
each year of our sample found no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of 
common distribution for public and private nonprofit hospitals, suggesting 
that case-mix variability is the same within each sub-sample. We also run 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on the distribution of the ratio between 
discharged patients and the number of beds, obtaining the same conclusion. 
Table 1 collects descriptive statistics for the main variables considered in 
the empirical analysis. On average, NFP producers appear larger than their 
public counterparts, both considering inputs and main outputs. This 
conclusion is reversed if one considers the number of DH and emergency 
rooms treatments. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 considers ALOS by years and type of hospitals. As expected, ALOS 
shows a steady decline from 1995 to 1999, although we observe a minor   22
increase in the last year of our sample period. When looking at the two sub-
samples, however, there appear to be strong differences between NFP and 
public producers, with the former able to respond more promptly and 
modify ALOS more significantly than the latter. 
 




In this section we present our efficiency score estimates, concentrating first 
on testing hypothesis H0(A), and distinguishing between non-parametric and 
parametric estimates. DEA results are presented in Table 4 and 5, and refer 
to a technology specified as an intertemporal frontier with VRS
18; we 
rejected the null hypothesis of CRS at a 1% confidence level by using a 
Banker’s test [40] (see Table 3). As described for instance in [41], since all 
the data are pooled, to estimate efficiency scores an assumption of time 
invariant technology is made when using an intertemporal frontier model
19. 
 
Table 3. Banker (1996) Tests for Returns to Scale 






H0: CRS vs H1: VRS  Test Stat.  Critical F 
(1%) 
Test Stat.  Critical F 
(1%) 
All 1.25  1.06  1.4  1.09 
Public 1.25  1.06  1.39  1.09 
NFP 1.95  1.34  2.26  1.52 
 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
18 Using a VRS technology specifications means that the efficiency scores refer to pure 
technical efficiency. See below Table 8 for the decomposition of overall technical 
efficiency in pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. 
19 We also experimented with contemporaneous frontiers, i.e., estimate efficiency scores 
for each year separately (on this point, see [38]). The main results are unchanged and the 
correlation between the two sets of scores is 0.87 for the model with the number of patients 
(0.86 for the model with the number of inpatient days). 
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Overall, NFP hospitals appear to be more efficient than their public 
counterparts (table 5). Moreover, for both types of producers, we observe a 
declining trend in efficiency, more marked for private NFP producers. In 
particular, in 1995 the average score is 0.73 for NFP and 0.64 for public 
hospitals; in year 2000, average scores are respectively 0.65 and 0.63. The 
efficiency scores of the different ownership forms thus appear to be 
converging (see also figure 1). 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Indeed, the efficiency scores between the two types of hospitals are 
statistically different by using both a Mann-Whitney (MW) and a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for the initial years of our sample period 
(1995, 1996 and 1997, even though in this last year only with the MW test). 
On the other hand, in the final years, in particular 1999 and 2000, NFP and 
public hospitals do not have significantly different efficiency scores. These 
conclusions do not vary substantially when considering all the years 
together but divided into the two sub-periods, before and after the 
introduction of the new DRG-based payment system. In both periods, 
statistically significant differences in mean efficiency levels are observed 
between NFP and public hospitals, but these differences tend to decrease 
over time. In sum, by using DEA we find some evidence that, as the impact 
of the DRG-PPS kicks in, the differences between ownership forms 
decrease; however, they become statistically insignificant only in the last 
year of the sample. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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To summarize, the analysis based on DEA shows two main findings
20. First, 
there appear to be a puzzling (and unexpected for policy makers) declining 
trend in efficiency. Second, the results seem to show support for the H0(A), 
i.e., there is convergence in efficiency between NFP and public hospitals as 
soon as the common DRG-based payment system is implemented. 
Parametric estimates of the output distance function are presented in Table 4 
and 6. For the two parametric versions of the model (COLS and SF), we 
control for the presence of outliers by using the leverage value [42]. Results 
seem to show a reasonable fit to observed data: adjusted R-squared are 
always in excess of 97%. Estimated coefficients on output first-order terms 
are always statistically different from zero and present the expected sign. 
Most of the estimated coefficients on input first-order terms are also 
statistically significant, even in the presence of multicollinearity among the 
six inputs
21. 
Mean efficiency scores derived from the output distance function estimated 
with COLS (including both time and regional fixed effects, see Table 4), 
appear always lower than those estimated with DEA for both types of 
hospitals and for all the years in the sample. In this case too, as a robustness 
check, we experimented with alternative models excluding time and 
regional fixed effects
22. On the contrary, as expected, mean efficiency 
                                                 
20 Notice however that we have few data points for the NFP hospitals, and thus one might 
question the construction of the frontier under the convexity assumption. When we run two 
separate DEA frontiers for public and NFP hospitals, results partially change (available 
from the authors upon request). We do not observe any decline in efficiency for NFP 
hospitals before and after the introduction of PPS; moreover, with respect to common 
frontier, average efficiency scores are higher. We do not observe convergence in the mean 
level of efficiency for public and private NFP producers. On the contrary, coherently with 
previous results, we do not observe any significant change in the efficiency of public 
hospitals. In fact, while the correlation for efficiency scores of public hospitals estimated 
with the common (to NFP) and separate frontier is 0.99, it is only 0.38 for NFP. This last 
result is due to the fact that public hospitals defines the common “best practice” frontier. 
However, running two separate DEA frontiers is equivalent to assuming that NFP and 
public hospitals have in fact different technologies, which we believe it is not very plausible 
an assumption. In addition, the DEA results we present in the paper are confirmed by the 
parametric estimation with both COLS and SF. 
21 Regressions results are not included here for brevity; all tables are available from authors 
upon requests. 
22 The correlation between efficiency scores obtained with the model including fixed 
effects and the model without fixed effects is 0.86. For more details, see [39].   25
scores obtained with SF are always higher than those obtained with DEA; 
however, correlation with estimates obtained with COLS is 0.87. 
As before, NFP hospitals appear to perform better than public hospitals at 
the beginning of our sample period (Table 6). However, mirroring the DEA 
analysis, after controlling for regional and time fixed effects we observe a 
convergence between NFP and public hospitals, due to a declining trend in 
technical efficiency mainly for private NFP producers (figure 1). Indeed, 
according to MW and KS tests, efficiency scores appear to be statistically 
different only for the years between 1995 and 1997. Thus, the technical 
efficiency of the two types of producers is different only before the 
introduction of the new DRG-based payment system; this last conclusion is 
valid for both SF and COLS. In addition, contrary to the DEA results, the 
disappearing differences between NFP and public hospitals are supported by 
the statistical tests of the two sub-periods for both set of results
23. 
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In sum, the results based on the COLS and SF analysis broadly confirm 
those obtained with DEA. We thus fail to reject H0(A) with both 
methodologies. In essence, the different efficiency performances of NFP 
and public hospitals, with these latter less efficient especially in the first 
years considered, seem to be the consequence of the different payment 
systems they had to face before the reform. Once a common payment 
system is introduced, the efficiency of the different proprietary forms under 
consideration tends to converge. 
The last two columns of Table 4, 5 and 6 provide a first test for our second 
hypothesis H0(B). When looking at DEA and SF estimates, MW and KS 
tests confirm a statistically significant decline in mean efficiency after the 
introduction of the new payment scheme (Table 4). On the contrary, the 
same tests do not detect differences between the two sub-periods when   26
comparing COLS results. Very clearly, figure 1 shows indeed that overall 
the mean efficiency scores based on COLS did not change over the period 
1995-2000
24. The main explanation for this result relies on the role of year 
dummies, that pick up the impact of the new payment system; we will 
further explore this issue in the second stage analysis below. 
Looking at the different ownership forms, results are more varied. With 
DEA, there appear to be differences between the two sub-periods, before 
and after the DRG introduction, even when distinguishing between different 
ownerships. Both the MW and the KS tests show that mean efficiency are 
different, but only at low significance levels. Overall, however, it seems 
reasonable to argue that the DEA analysis shows a decrease in mean 
efficiency levels, for hospitals of both proprietary forms, after the 
introduction of the DRG payment system. With COLS the impact of the 
DRG introduction affects only the NFP hospitals: indeed, public hospitals 
performance remains stable over time, whilst that of NFP ones decreases 
(Table 6). On the contrary, reinforcing the DEA results, scores obtained 
with the SF methodology suggest that, for both types of hospitals, there is a 
statistically significant change in performance following the introduction of 
the new payment system; but reaction of NFP seems on average to be 
greater than that of public producers
25. Thus, our findings provide evidence 
to reject H0(B), since efficiency levels either remain stable, i.e., for public 
hospitals with COLS, or decrease, in all the other cases. This is unsurprising 
considering previous results on the US experience (e.g., [17]), and concerns 
expressed in [21] on the combined effect of PPS, de-hospitalization policies, 




                                                                                                                            
23 See the results of KS and MW tests in the columns titled “before DRG” and “after DRG” 
of Table 6. 
24 Since the vast majority of hospitals is public, the mean efficiency score for all hospitals 
and for the sub-sample of public hospitals tend to be very close.   27
Taken as a whole, our findings support the idea that the introduction of a 
DRG-based reimbursement scheme caused a decline in technical efficiency, 
more pronounced for private NFP hospitals than for public ones. In this 
sense, the former appear to respond more promptly than the latter to the 
change in incentives caused by the change in the payment scheme. This may 
depend on the quite different power of incentive of the reimbursement 
scheme used before and after the reform implementation. However, the new 
payment system seems to be the cause of the convergence in the observed 
mean level of efficiency between the two types of producers (even though a 
longer panel would provide more conclusive evidence for the disappearance 
of any differences in mean efficiency scores).  
Our findings thus seem to emphasize the private nature of NFP hospitals, 
mirroring results in [15], that identifies the main difference between public, 
private for-profit and private NFP hospitals in the soft budget constraint of 
government-owned institutions. In other words, our results suggest that 
different performances found among the various ownership structures may 
be due more to the different payments systems they face than to their 
intrinsic incentive structures. 
Of course, one can claim that our results on the different behaviour for 
public and private hospitals are not entirely due to the introduction of the 
new payment system based on DRG weights. For instance, it is possible that 
– besides the newly introduced system – regional policies have changed 
with respect to the relative role given to public and private producers.  
To be sure that the observed impact on efficiency is due to change in 
incentives derived from reimbursement schemes, we consider also a second 
stage analysis based on the following general Tobit model: 
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25 Notice that the decrease in (average) performance experienced by NFP hospitals seems to 
be due to the increase in the variance of efficiency scores.   28
where EFF are the efficiency scores estimates derived from both COLS and 
SF, and X = (DRG, PREXP, Rf), where DRG is a dummy variable equal to 0 
from 1995 to 1997, and equal to 1 from 1998 onwards; PREXP measures 
the share of regional public health expenditure devoted to private producers; 
Rf are regional fixed effects aimed at capturing different regional policies 
and structural differences constant across years.  
Our results on the different behaviour induced by the change in hospitals’ 
reimbursement would be reinforced, if – after controlling for some of the 
factors that can affect efficiency – the coefficient on DRG still remains 
significant. Table 7 contains three sets of estimates for our Tobit model, 
differing for the specifications of the output distance function from which 
efficiency scores are derived (namely SF and COLS with and without 
regional and year fixed effects). All the three sets of regressions tell us fairly 
the same story: the DRG dummy coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant even after controlling for PREXP  and  Rf, the regional fixed 
effects
26, thus reinforcing our conclusions that the change in incentives 
caused a reaction in hospitals’ behaviour.  
Moreover, the reaction was sharper for private than for public hospitals, as 
interacting the DRG dummy with a dummy for public (PUB) and for private 
NFP (NFP) hospitals, we obtain coefficients that are both negative, but 
different in magnitude. This latter conclusion is strengthened by a LR test, 
that confirms the difference between the two coefficients. Finally, the 
coefficient on PREXP is always positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting a positive role of private producers in influencing hospitals 
efficiency, presumably through a more competitive environment. 
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
One point that deserves further discussion concerns the interpretation of our 
results, especially in order to derive policy implications. The new DRG-  29
based payment system was introduced to increase the level of efficiency of 
all producers in the Italian hospital industry. However, opposite to 
expectations and to the observed decline in ALOS, our findings seem to 
indicate that (technical) efficiency levels started to decline after the change 
in the reimbursement scheme, and this affected more private NFP hospitals 
than public producers. One possible explanation relies on the fact that the 
change in the reimbursement scheme went together with a significant 
reshaping of the hospital industry, guided by policies aimed at reducing 
hospitalization rates (see, e.g., [21]).  
Indeed, when looking at aggregate data at the national level, the observed 
decline in ALOS is driven by the decrease in the number of inpatient days 
more marked than the reduction in the number of patients. However, while 
the number of beds started declining in 1998, the number of medical staff 
did not, thus resulting in a growth of workers per bed. This effect was more 
pronounced for private hospitals than for public ones. In other words, 
hospitals reduced their “capacity” while maintaining their personnel. 
Indirect evidence on this point is available by looking at capacity utilization 
rates: while private hospitals recorded an increase in excess capacity, public 
hospitals showed a decline. All these trends are replicated in our sample. Of 
course, the decline in outputs coupled with only a partial reduction in inputs 
offers an explanation to the estimated declining trend in (technical) 
efficiency. 
A partial support to this argument – which however deserves a more 
specific and thorough investigation – can be obtained by studying the nature 
of the returns to scale. The observed change in the input-mix stems from a 
reduction of productive capacity, in terms of the number of beds. Holding 
the sample of hospitals fixed, this should have caused more producers to be 
operating in the region of increasing returns to scale. As for DEA, in the 
previous analysis we have been discussing pure technical efficiency results, 
                                                                                                                            
26 It should be noted that year fixed effects cannot be included in the model since the DRG 
dummy is a linear combination of year fixed effects.   30
i.e., efficiency scores based on a VRS specification. We now decompose 
these scores according to Eq. (4) above; results are in Table 8.  
Overall technical efficiency is now lower because of scale inefficiency. 
Indeed, scale efficiency, even if quite high (almost 0.9 overall), is lower 
than 1, and thus it lowers overall efficiency compared to pure technical 
efficiency. Notice as well that the hospitals operating in the area of 
increasing returns to scale are almost one sixth overall. However, they are 
more frequent in public hospitals and increasing over time, going from 
14.8% before to 17% after the introduction of the new reimbursement 
scheme. On the other hand, in the case of NFP, we find a lower incidence of 
hospitals operating under increasing returns, and they are anyway 
decreasing over time: from 7.9% to 4.8% after the DRG-based payment 
mechanism introduction. Controlling for size, as expected all of the 




[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Scale efficiency estimates can be derived also in the parametric setting, as 
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is equal to unity, since constant returns of scale hold locally. Table 9 shows 
our estimates obtained by considering the SF model. Confirming the general 
picture emerging from DEA estimates, very modest increasing returns 
                                                 
27 The distribution of size is made according to the number of beds: small hospitals are 
those in the first quartile, medium hospitals are those in the second and third quartile, large 
hospitals are in the fourth quartile.   31
seems to emerge in the industry, with most hospitals operating at constant 
returns to scale. Moreover, we observe no change in mean scale efficiency 
before and after the introduction of the new payment system. 
 
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In conclusion, given the mild presence of scale economies, the reshaping of 
the hospital industry seems to have contributed to the decline in (technical) 
efficiency, because of the induced modification in the input-mix. From this 
point of view, one needs to discuss the technological properties of hospital 
services production function, before suggesting any policy. If labour and 
capital tend to be complements, then the input-mix change can be justified 
only by some (unmeasured here) quality increase of the services produced. 
Available evidence (see, e.g., [26]) seems to suggest that, at best, we did not 
observe a decline in quality. And this raises additional doubts about the 
effectiveness of the recently implemented policies toward hospitals in 





5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we try to identify behavioral differences between public and 
private NFP hospitals, by exploiting the introduction of a PPS-DRG based 
in the Italian NHS in the second half of the Nineties. The introduction of the 
new payment system was aimed at increasing producers’ efficiency, and 
thus controlling public spending growth. The relevant role of private 
nonprofit hospitals in Western European countries represents an excellent 
opportunity to test theories that deem nonprofit organizations as more 
efficient than public (or private for-profit) providers when asymmetric 
information and uncertainty prevail in a market.   32
In order to evaluate the impact of different ownership structures on hospital 
efficiency, we estimate the (technical) efficiency of a sample of hospitals for 
the period 1995-2000, by adopting both parametric and non-parametric 
approaches. We use DEA with an output oriented model for the non-
parametric approach. We also follow a parametric approach using both 
COLS and SF techniques, and estimate a translog output distance function, 
to accommodate multiple inputs and outputs. Our results show a 
convergence of mean efficiency scores between NFP and public hospitals, 
and seem to emphasize the private nature of NFP hospitals, supporting the 
hypothesis that public and private nonprofit hospitals differ in their response 
to the introduction of the new payment system, with the latter responding 
more promptly than the former to PPS introduction.  
Contrary to expectations, we also observe a decline in technical efficiency, 
probably due to policies aimed at reducing hospitalization rates. In other 
words, the observed reduction can be explained as the sum of two 
countervailing effects: on the one hand, the introduction of the DRG-based 
payment system might have improved hospitals efficiency; on the other 
hand, the reshaping of the hospital industry and the process of de-
hospitalization – by reducing the number of patients - might have more than 
offset the gains in (technical) efficiency. One possible extension of the paper 
would be to disentangle these two effects to offer an evaluation of the effect 
of the DRG payment system of the two types of hospitals. This is left for 
future research. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
(Mean values; standard deviation in parentheses) 
  NFP PUB All 
Inputs      
Beds  402 (410)  277 (299)  282 (305) 
Beds for DH   24 (34)  27 (38)  27 (38) 
Physicians  146 (170)  107 (132)  108 (134) 
Nurses  354 (416)  273 (319)  276 (324) 
Teaching staff  3 (5)  1 (3)  1 (3) 
Other personnel  33 (62)  24 (51)  25 (51) 
      


























      





Table 2. ALOS by years and type of hospitals          
           
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  Before  DRG After  DRG
           
All hospitals  7.80 (1.81)  7.41 (1.81) 7.10 (1.75) 7.02 (1.77) 7.37 (2.25) 7.42 (2.50) 7.44 (1.81)  7.27 (2.20)
NFP  8.80 (1.53)  8.08 (1.21) 7.61 (1.31) 7.39 (1.57) 7.71 (1.78) 7.46 (1.61) 8.16 (1.42)  7.52 (1.64)
Public  7.76 (1.81)  7.39 (1.82) 7.08 (1.77) 7.00 (1.77) 7.35 (2.27) 7.41 (2.53) 7.41 (1.82)  7.26 (2.22)
           
Mean values; standard deviation in parentheses 
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Table 4. Efficiency scores by year: output distance function (all hospitals) 
     
  Test (§) 
Methodology  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  Before  DRG After  DRG  MW  KS 
     
DEA    0.64 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.65 2.41 0.06 
  (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) [0.02] [0.01] 
COLS   0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.43 1.22 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) [0.68] [0.10] 
SF    0.80 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.74 0.72 0.82 0.75 3.64 2.49 
(0.22) (0.15) (0.17) (0.21) (0.29) (0.32) (0.18) (0.28) [0.00] [0.00] 
     
Mean values; standard deviation in parentheses. 
(§) Mann-Whitney test for equality of means and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions before and after DRG introduction; p-values in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Efficiency scores by year and ownership type: output distance function (DEA estimates) 
     
  Test (*) 
Type  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  before DRG after DRG  MW KS 
     
NFP  0.73 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.67 0.65 0.74 0.70 1.61 0.21 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) [0.11] [0.10] 
PUB  0.64 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.65 2.12 0.05 
(0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) [0.03] [0.02] 
MW  (§)  2.36  2.3  2.05 2.14 1.13 0.66 3.85 2.12     
  [0.02] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.26] [0.51] [0.00[ [0.03]     
KS  (§)  0.31 0.31 0.24 0.25 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.15     
[0.03] [0.04] [0.14] [0.10] [0.56] [0.61] [0.00] [0.08]     
     
Mean values; standard deviation in parentheses. 
(§) Mann-Whitney test for equality of means and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions between different types of hospitals; p-values in parentheses. 
(*) Mann-Whitney test for equality of means and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions before and after DRG introduction; p-values in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Efficiency scores by year and ownership type: output distance function (COLS and SF estimates) 
    
   Test (*) 
Methodology  Type 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  before  DRG after  DRG MW KS 
    
SF    NFP 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.62 0.46 0.92 0.60 4.14 2.17 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.41) (0.46) (0.03) (0.42) [0.00] [0.00] 
PUB 0.79 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.74 0.72 0.82 0.76 3.03 2.29 
  (0.21) (0.15) (0.18) (0.21) (0.28) (0.31) (0.18) (0.27) [0.00] [0.00] 
MW  (§)  3.57 3.04 2.77 2.21 0.49 1.73 5.41 0.85     
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.63] [0.08] [0.00] [0.40]     
KS  (§)  1.85 1.80 1.53 1.54 0.77 1.51 2.71 1.51     
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.59] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02]     
           
COLS  NFP 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.68 0.63 2.89 1.45 
    (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) [0.00] [0.03] 
PUB 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.16 1.20 
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) [0.87] [0.11] 
MW  (§)  2.85 2.40 2.30 1.54 0.34 1.14 4.42 1.58     
  [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.12] [0.73] [0.25] [0.00] [0.11]     
KS  (§)  1.46 1.34 1.50 0.98 0.72 0.93 2.25 1.28     
  [0.03] [0.05] [0.02] [0.30] [0.67] [0.35] [0.00] [0.08]     
    
Mean values; standard deviation in parentheses. 
(§) Mann-Whitney test for equality of means and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions between different types of hospitals; p-values in parentheses. 
(*) Mann-Whitney test for equality of means and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions before and after DRG introduction; p-values in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Second stage analysis (Tobit models)        
             
Dep. Var.: EFF scores  SF  COLS - w/o FE  COLS - FE 
             
DRG    -0.04***    -0.02***    -0.03***    
    (0.010)    (0.007)    (0.007)    
DRG*PUB   -0.03***  0.004    -0.017**  -0.0004    -0.02***  -0.015 
     (0.010)  (0.02)    (0.007)  (0.014)    (0.007)  (0.014) 
DRG*NFP  -0.214***  -0.167***    -0.144***  -0.124***    -0.15***  -0.14*** 
      (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.028)  (0.032) 
PREXP   0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***  0.025***  0.026***  0.026***  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
PREXP*DRG     -0.004**      -0.001      -0.001 
            (0.002)        (0.001)        (0.001) 
Nr.  obs.    2572 2572 2572 2572 2572 2572 2572 2572 2572 
Log-L.    -569.20  -559.30  -556.89 279.96 289.96 290.94 307.22 317.55 317.91 
LR test (a)     19.80  24.63     20.01  21.97     20.66  21.38 
MLE. Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. Regional fixed effects included in all regressions. Lev. of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.   
(a) Test equality of DRG*PUB and DRG*NFP. Critical values Chi-sq (1).           
 
  
Table 8. Decomposition of DEA efficiency scores 














      
All 3186  0.568  0.881  0.655  494  (15.5%)
Public 3060  0.566  0.882  0.652  486  (15.9%)
NFP 126  0.603  0.855  0.721  8  (6.3%) 
Before DRG 
(1995-1997) 
       
All 1593  0.573  0.882  0.662  231  (14.5%)
Public 1530  0.571  0.883  0.658  226  (14.8%)
NFP 63  0.617  0.847  0.742  5  (7.9%) 
After DRG 
(1998-2000) 
       
All 1593  0.563  0.881  0.648  263  (16.5%)
Public 1530  0.562  0.882  0.646  260  (17%) 
NFP 63  0.589  0.863  0.699  3  (4.8%) 
By 
dimension 
       
Small 2904  0.572  0.906  0.638  494  (17%) 
Medium 258  0.524  0.644  0.817  0  (0%) 
Large 24  0.489  0.526  0.928  0  (0%) 
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Table 9. Scale efficiency estimates from SF model 
       
   Mean Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
All hospitals  1.002  0.003  1.000  1.026 
By dimension        
Small hospitals (1st quartile)  1.003  0.003  1.000  1.026 
Medium hospitals (2nd-3rd quartile) 1.001 0.002 1.000 1.012 
Large hospitals (4th quartile)  1.000  0.0007  1.000  1.002 
By ownership types        
NFP   1.004  0.006  1.000  1.023 
Public   1.002  0.003  1.000  1.026 
By years        
Before DRG  1.003  0.003  1.000  1.021 
After DRG    1.003  0.004  1.000  1.026 
 







































































































Figure 1. Mean efficiency scores 